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The General Assembly did not take any action regarding the
Family Court issue in 1997. In 1996, funding for the family
court was delayed until June 1, 1998, subject to state funds
being "sufficient to provide adequate resources ... for the court
to carry out the purposes of [Virginia Code section 20-96] and
to fulfill its mission to serve children and families of the Com-
monwealth."'
B. Divorce
1. Same Sex Marriages
In response to the recognition of marriages between persons
of the same sex by other states, Virginia Code section 20-45.2
was amended to provide that all marriages entered into by
persons of the same sex in other states or jurisdictions, as well
as any contractual rights created by such marriages, "shall be
void in all respects in Virginia. 2
* Partner, Bremner, Janus & Cook, Richmond, Virginia. BA., 1988, University
of Richmond, Westhampton College; J.D., 1991, University of Richmond School of
Law. The author wishes to thank Traci L. Flanagan for her assistance in helping
prepare this article.
** Former Associate, Moreno, Colan & Butler, Richmond, Virginia. BA., 1987,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D., 1991, University of Richmond School of
Law.
1. Act of April 5, 1996, ch. 616, 1996 Va. Acts 1082.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Cure Supp. 1997).
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2. State Tax Refunds
The legislature amended the statute regarding state refunds
to individual taxpayers by providing a mechanism for the reis-
suance of separate tax refund checks to parties who receive a
final divorce decree after filing a joint income tax return.3 Sep-
arate refund checks will be reissued to each party upon the re-
turn of the joint refund check with a certification made by one
spouse that the other spouse refuses to endorse it or cannot be
found. A certified copy of the final divorce decree and any
agreements with respect to the division of property between the
spouses must also be provided with the certification.4 If the
decree addresses how the refund is to be divided, the refund
will be apportioned according to the order.5 If the decree is si-
lent on the issue, the refund will be divided equally between
the parties.6 The reissuance of refund payments will not affect




All divorce decrees must now include "each party's social
security number, or other control number issued by the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles."8
D. Equitable Distribution
For the fourth consecutive year, there were no changes made
or introduced to Virginia's equitable distribution statute.'





8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).





a. Termination/Modification of Spousal Support
The legislature extended the trial court's authority to termi-
nate or modify spousal support payable to a spouse who has
been habitually cohabiting with another person in a relation-
ship analogous to a marriage for one year or more commencing
on or after July 1, 1997, unless the termination will constitute
"a manifest injustice.""0 The court may not, however, decrease
or terminate spousal support and maintenance if the parties
have agreed otherwise in a stipulation or contract." Interest-
ingly, the burdens of proof in this statute differ. The cohabita-
tion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, while
"manifest injustice" may be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence." Although the statute suggests the conditions are
not met by parties cohabiting for a period of less than one year,
arguably, the court should still be able to consider the effect of
the cohabitation on the spouse's need."
b. Rehabilitative Spousal Support
The Virginia State Bar submitted its study and recommenda-
tions on the issue of rehabilitative alimony, but the suggestions
were not considered by the full House of Delegates during the
1997 session. 4 A bill granting the court authority to order pe-
riodic payments to a spouse over a specific period of time did
not pass. 5 The court's authority continues to be limited to or-
dering spousal support in periodic payments over an indefinite
period of time, in a lump sum, or both. 6
10. Id. § 20-109(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
11. See iUL
12. See iU
13. See, e.g., Hollowell v. Hollowell, 6 Va. App. 417, 369 S.E.2d 451 (1988).
14. See H.J. Res. 594, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997) (originally passed as
H.J. Res. 69, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)).
15. See H.B. 2586, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997).
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
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2. Child Support
a. Wage Withholding
A wage withholding order may now be entered upon the
petition of an obligor.'7 When such a request is made by an
obligor, notice of the withholding and the rights to contest the
order are not necessary."
b. License Restrictions
When a person has failed to comply with a subpoena, sum-
mons or warrant in a child support or paternity matter, restric-
tions may now be placed on his or her driver's license. 9 If the
court issues a restricted license, the driver may not operate a
commercial vehicle.2' The court must order the surrender of
the driver's license in accordance with Virginia Code section
46.2-398.21
Persons who apply for a license, certificate or authorization
to engage in a trade or profession must include their social
security number or other control number issued by the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles on their application.'
If an obligor is in arrears for a period of more than ninety
days or for an amount over five thousand dollars, or has failed
to comply with a subpoena or warrant related to child support,
the obligor's hunting, fishing, or other recreational licenses may
also be restricted.'
A delinquent obligor attempting to have his or her license
restored pursuant to an agreement for the repayment of
arrearages must agree to pay the arrears in full within a period
of ten years. He or she must also make at least one payment
17. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
18. See id.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-320(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
20. See id. § 46.2-320(c) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
21. See id.; id. § 46.2-398 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
22. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-116, 63.1-263.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-263.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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totaling five percent of the arrearage or five hundred dollars,
whichever is greater.'
c. Federal Welfare Reform Act of 1996'
Pursuant to the mandates of the Federal Welfare Reform Act
of 1996, Virginia has significantly enhanced its child support
enforcement laws. Several provisions were added to the notice
requirements in support orders. Formerly, parties were required
to provide only their current address and place of employment
in a support order." Parties are now required to provide both
a physical address and a mailing address if they are different,
work and home telephone numbers, driver's license numbers
and their employer's address.'
The General Assembly also added a new method of process
service in subsequent child support matters. Where diligent
efforts to locate a party are unsuccessful, the petitioner may
serve written notice to the respondent's last residential address
or work address as listed in the previous order.' If an order is
entered based upon this method of service, the obligor may
later challenge the order if he did not receive actual notice of
the proceedings and if he can prove the entry of the prior order
constitutes a manifest injustice.'
The Department of Social Services (DSS) now has access to
criminal history records when trying to locate delinquent child
support obligors or alleged putative fathers in paternity ac-
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-320(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997). The previous statute
only required the delinquent obligor to make one payment pursuant to an agreement
in order to have their driver's license restored. See id. § 46.2-320 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
25. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
26. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-60.3, 63.1-252.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
27. See id. §§ 20-60.3, 63.1-252.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). A person may be exempt
from these requirements if a protective order has been issued or the Department of
Social Services has reason to believe that a party is at risk of physical or emotional
harm from the other party. See id.
28. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-60.6, 63.1-250.2:1 (Cums Supp. 1997).
29. See id. § 20-60.6 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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tions.30 Access is limited to demographic information on the
delinquent obligor."'
The Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) may now
obtain public information on delinquent obligors from govern-
mental agencies, financial institutions and cable television com-
panies. The DCSE is authorized to subpoena financial records
or other information relating to both the obligor and the obli-
gee. 2 The DCSE may charge a civil penalty of up to one thou-
sand dollars for failure to respond to a subpoena.'
The DSS may now enter into agreements with financial insti-
tutions to develop and operate data match systems to locate de-
linquent obligors.' Financial institutions would provide the
DSS with information on delinquent obligors by matching their
social security numbers or other tax identification information
to existing accounts.' Financial institutions are immune from
liability for disclosing information. 8
The DCSE is also authorized to obtain information on com-
pensation and settlements from the Workers' Compensation
Commission.37
The statutes regarding paternity establishment have been
strengthened in an effort to enforce an individual's obligations
to provide child support." A voluntary written statement ac-
knowledging paternity is now binding and conclusive as a judg-
ment sixty days from the signing date." If a party moves for
30. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(AX27) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
31. See ic.
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 1997). The Code does not
define "other information" except to say that DSCE can require the production of
essential information for the establishment or enforcement of support obligations. See
id.
33. See id.
34. See id. § 63.1-260.3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
35. See id The financial institution has a reasonable time to produce the request-
ed information, but not less than 30 days. See id.
36. See id
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-903 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
38. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-49.1 to -49.9 (Cum. Supp. 1997); see also 42
U.S.C.S. § 666 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). These amendments do not apply in cases of
assisted conception. The assisted conception statutes were clarified in 1997 to provide
that the donor of a child conceived through assisted conception is not the parent of
the child unless the donor is the husband of the gestational mother. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-156, -158 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
39. See id. § 20-49.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997). This provision is inapplicable if the
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genetic testing in a paternity action, the notice must be accom-
panied by a sworn affidavit either setting forth facts that would
establish a reasonable possibility of the necessary sexual con-
tact between the parties, or denying paternity.'
Pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Welfare Reform
Act,4' paternity can now be established by administrative ac-
tion.42 The Virginia DSS can establish a relationship between
a father and child if a child, parent or other legal custodian of
the child files a verified request at any time before the child's
eighteenth birthday.' The DSS may summon a parent or pu-
tative father to appear before the DCSE and provide the neces-
sary information. The DSS can then establish paternity by
obtaining a written statement under oath or by ordering genetic
testing." The DSS is required to pay for the testing subject to
reimbursement by the father if paternity is established.45
d. Periodic Review of Child Support Orders
At the request of a parent or the DCSE, the DSS shall initi-
ate a review of any existing child support order every three
years without requiring a showing of a change in circumstanc-
es.
46
e. Payments to Obligees
Beginning January 1, 1998, the DCSE must distribute sup-
port payments to obligees within two business days of receipt."
person contesting paternity establishes that the statement was signed as a result of
fraud, duress or a material mistake of fact. See id. Pending resolution of a challenged
paternity acknowledgement, each party will continue to have the same obligations
toward the child except upon a showing of good cause. See id.
40. See id. § 20-49.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
41. 42 U.S.C.S. § 666(aX5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1:2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
43. See id.
44. See id. Genetic testing must establish paternity by at least a 98% probability.
See id.
45. See i&
46. See id. § 63.1-250.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
47. See id. § 63.1-251.2 (Cure. Supp. 1997). The DSS must have sufficient infor-
mation to identify the obligee and know where the distribution should be made. See
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f. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)45
All states that have adopted or will be adopting UIFSA are
required to amend their state statutes to conform to the version
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws pursuant to the Federal Welfare Reform
Act.49 "Initiating state" has been redefined as a state from
which a proceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is
filed for forwarding to a responding state.50 The term "state"
now includes the U.S. Virgin Islands.5 In Virginia, only par-
ties who are individuals need to file "written consent with a
tribunal of this Commonwealth for a tribunal of another state
to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 52
In cases where two or more child support orders have been
issued by a tribunal of this state or another state with regard
to the same obligor and child, and either the obligor or obligee
resides in Virginia, a party may request a tribunal of the Com-
monwealth to determine which order controls." That order
must then be recognized under UIFSA.' In determining which
child support order controls, the court must include written
findings on how it made its determination." Once the court
determines which order controls, the party obtaining the order
has thirty days to provide a certified copy to each tribunal that
issued or registered the earlier child support order.56 If the
party who obtains the order fails to follow this procedure, they
may be sanctioned.5" If a party seeks to modify and/or enforce
48. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.32-.82 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
49. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 654(20), 666 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.32 (Cure. Supp. 1997). The statute formerly de-
fined "initiating state" as a "state in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a
responding state." See id. § 20-88.32 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
51. See id. § 20-88.32 (Cure. Supp. 1997).
52. Id. § 20-88.39(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1997). This section previously stated the
Commonwealth retained jurisdiction "until each individual party had filed written con-
sent," which was meant to include agency parties. Id. § 20-88.39(A)(2) (Repl. Vol.
1996).
53. See id. § 20-88.41(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
54. See id.
55. See id. § 20-88.41(E) (Cum. Supp. 1997).




an order from another state, they must register the order in
Virginia and then file a petition specifying the grounds for
modification."
Under the new UIFSA statutes, Virginia courts may or may
not have jurisdiction to modify or enforce existing support or-
ders issued in other states.5 9 Further, even if Virginia properly
exercises jurisdiction, the court may be required to apply anoth-
er state's laws.' All modification orders must be sent to the
original issuing state."
Wage withholding orders are no longer required to be sent to
employers by first class mail. 2 Requirements for an employer
to comply with wage withholding orders of another state have
been clarified significantly.' Employers' processing fees, with-
holding amounts, and time periods for making payments must
be in compliance with the law of the state of the obligor's place
of employment." When an employer receives multiple wage
withholding orders for the same employee, satisfaction of the
terms of the multiple orders and priorities for withholding must
comply with the laws of the state of the obligor's principal place
of employment.65 Furthermore, employers complying with wage
withholding orders in accordance with the statute are immune
from civil liability.' If an employer willfully fails to comply
with a wage withholding order issued by another state and
received for enforcement, the employer is subject to the same
penalties that may be imposed for non-compliance with an or-
der issued by a Virginia court.' An obligor may contest the
validity or enforcement of a wage withholding order issued in
another state and received by an employer in the Common-
wealth of Virginia by giving notice to the support enforcement
58. See id. § 20-88.74 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
59. See, e.g., id. § 20-88.77:1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). Virginia Code section 20-88.39
specifically lists the requirements for exercising jurisdiction which must be carefully
reviewed by the practitioner. See id. § 20-88.39 (Cumn. Supp. 1997).
60. See id. § 20-88.77:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
61. See id. § 20-88.77:2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
62. See id. § 20-88.64 (Cum. Supp. 1997); see also id. § 20-88.64(A) (Repl. Vol.
1995).
63. See id. §§ 20-88.64:1-.64:5 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
64. See id. § 20-88.64:1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
65. See id. § 20-88.64:2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
66. See id. § 20-88.64:3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
67. See id. § 20-88.64:4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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agency servicing the obligee, each employer that has received
the wage withholding order, and the person or agency designat-
ed to receive the payments in the order." When a support or
wage withholding order issued in another state is registered in
a Virginia court, notice to the non-registering party no longer
has to be made by first class mail or personal service.69
3. Custody
a. Educational Programs Relating to Parenting and Divorce
In suits for divorce, custody, or visitation, the court can enter
pendente lite orders requiring parties with minor children to
attend seminars regarding parenting responsibilities, options for
conflict resolution, and financial responsibilities.7 °
b. Third Party Standing
The legislature has specifically eliminated the right of a per-
son to seek custody or visitation if his or her parental rights
have been terminated by court order, either voluntarily or in-
voluntarily.7 This prohibition also extends to other persons
whose interest in the child derives from or through the person
whose parental rights have been terminated.72
68. See id. § 20-88.64:5 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
69. See id. §§ 20-88.70-.71 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
70. See id. § 20-103(A) (Cure. Supp. 1997). No fee in excess of $50 may be
charged for a program. See id. Previously, the court had authority only to order the
parties to attend "educational seminars and other like programs." Id. § 20-103(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
71. See id. § 20-124.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (defining "person with a legitimate in-
terest" in custody and visitation issues). The new amendment specifically overrules
Thrift v. Baldwin, 23 Va. App. 18, 473 S.E.2d 715 (1996), where the Virginia Court
of Appeals held that Virginia Code section 16.1-241 was to be construed broadly to
include blood relatives of adopted children as "persons with a legitimate interest."
Thrift, 23 Va. App. at 19-20, 473 S.E.2d at 716.
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997). Formerly the statute
applied only where the parental rights had been involuntarily terminated. See id. §
16.1-241 (Rep]. Vol. 1995).
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c. Non-Custodial Parents' School Participation Rights
Non-custodial parents can no longer be denied the opportuni-
ty to participate in public school or day care events for their
children simply because of their status as a non-custodial par-
ent, unless a court order has been issued stating otherwise.73
It is the custodial parent's responsibility to provide the court
order to the school or day care center.74
4. Domestic Violence
The General Assembly passed an act in 1996, which took
effect on July 1, 1997, requiring the establishment of training
standards and model policies for law-enforcement personnel in
handling domestic violence.75
Law enforcement officers may now arrest persons without a
warrant for domestic violence committed outside the officer's
presence based upon the officer's personal observations,
probable cause, the reasonable complaint of a person who ob-
served the alleged offense, or upon the officer's investigation.7"
If the officer finds probable cause of a violation, and the totality
of the circumstances shows that the alleged offender was the
primary physical aggressor, the officer must arrest and take
into custody the abuser.77 Regardless of whether an arrest is
made, the officer must file a written report with the police
department, and a copy of the report must be provided to the
alleged abuser upon request.78 In these cases, the alleged vic-
tim must be provided with information regarding legal and
community resources.79
An officer must petition the court for an emergency protective
order pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-253.4 if he or she
arrests an alleged abuser or there is probable cause of domestic
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.5 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
74. See id.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-170(36) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
76. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
77. See id. § 19.2-81.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
78. See id. § 19.2-81.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
79. See id.
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violence." The Virginia State Police and all local police and
sheriff departments must establish policies and procedures for
arrests in family abuse situations.81
In family abuse cases, venue is now proper in the jurisdiction
where a protective order was issued, if at the time the proceed-
ing was commenced the order was issued to protect the peti-
tioner or a family member.82 Protective orders have also been
expanded to include family or household members of an abused
child as parties that must observe certain conditions of behav-
ior.' The court may also give the alleged abused person exclu-
sive temporary possession and use of a jointly titled motor ve-
hicle.' In pendente lite orders and suits for divorce, custody or
visitation, civil courts can also enter protective orders against
family or household members. 5
Courts are permitted to enter preliminary protective orders
upon evidence sufficient to establish probable cause that family
abuse has recently occurred.8 The court must hold a hearing
within fifteen days of the date of the order. If the petitioner
requests it, the clerk must provide him or her with a copy of
the order and information regarding when the alleged abuser
will be or was served. 7 The court may issue ex parte emer-
gency orders if the petitioner asserts abuse under oath to a
judge or magistrate, provided such order "expires] at 5:00 p.m.
on the next day that the juvenile ... court is in session or
[within] seventy-two hours if the juvenile court is not in ses-
sion, whichever is later."" A respondent's motion to dismiss an
emergency ex parte protective order must be given precedence
on the docket.89 The protective orders must be reduced to writ-
80. See id. § 19.2-81.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
81. See id. § 19.2-81.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
83. See id. § 16.1-253(AX1X6) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
84. See id. § 16.1-253.1(AX5) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (orders for exclusive use of joint-
ly titled motor vehicles do not affect title or ownership.)
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997). This section was amended
in 1996 with an effective date of July 1, 1997. Prior to this amendment, the civil
court's authority was limited to entry of protective orders against spouses. See id. §
20-103(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
87. See id. § 16.1-253.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
88. Id. § 16.1-253.4(B), (C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
89. See id. § 16.1-253.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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ing on a form approved by the Supreme Court of Virginia.0
The magistrate shall issue an emergency protective order
against the abuser when he or she is arrested and brought
before the magistrate.9 Any person who is the subject of a
protective order may not purchase or transport firearms while
the order is in effect. A violation of this statute is a Class 1
misdemeanor and the sentence cannot be suspended.2
When a protective order is served, the agency serving the
order must immediately place the information in the Virginia
crime information network system." The local police or
sheriffs office must receive notice of all protective orders and
any additional information required by the State Police.'
11. JuDIcIAL DECISIONS
A. Equitable Distribution
There were two major cases dealing with equitable distribu-
tion decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals this year. Since
each case touches upon several different aspects of equitable
distribution, they will be addressed individually. These cases
are also mentioned in other sections of the article.
1. Rowe v. Rowe95
a. Classification of Husband's Pre-Marital Stock
In Rowe, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that increases in
the value of the husband's separate newspaper stock during the
marriage can only be classified as marital to the extent that
such increases are attributable to the husband's personal efforts
90. See id. § 16.1-253.4(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
92. See id. § 18.2-308.1:4(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1996). All orders dissolving or
modifying a protective order shall also be forwarded to the Virginia crime information
network system. See id.
94. See id.
95. 24 Va. App. 123, 480 S.E.2d 760 (1997).
1997] 1081
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1069
and not to those of his partner/brother or passive factors. 6 In
Rowe, the husband presented evidence that he decreased his
duties at the newspaper during the marriage, while his
brother's duties substantially increased. Further, it was undis-
puted that the stock's increased value was largely due to the
fact that the number of households in the circulation area had
more than doubled during the parties' twenty-three year mar-
riage.97
b. Compensation as Fair Return on Increase in Separate
Property"
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of compensa-
tion as a fair return on the increase in separate property in the
1993 case of Huger v. Huger.99 In Huger, the divorce suit was
filed when Virginia recognized only a unitary property theo-
ry." In Rowe, the court of appeals expanded the Huger ruling
to apply to hybrid property as well.' Thus, to the extent a
spouse can prove the marital estate has been adequately com-
pensated for a spouse's effort, the trial court should consider
that compensation before classifying any increase in value of a
separate asset as marital.0 2
c. Classification of Marital Residence--Gifts
When the parties were married in Rowe, they lived in the
husband's premarital residence for approximately four
years."03 During that time, the wife contributed her separate
96. See id. at 134, 480 S.E.2d at 765.
97. See id. at 133-34, 480 S.E.2d at 764-65.
98. See id. at 134, 480 S.E.2d at 765.
99. 16 Va. App. 785, 789, 433 S.E.2d 255, 258 (1993).
100. See id. at 787, 433 S.E.2d at 257; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(AX3)
(Cum. Supp. 1997). Prior to the enactment of this statute in 1990, Virginia had only
two classifications of property, marital and separate. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989). Now there is a third classification, "part mari-
tal property and part separate property," which is commonly referred to by practitio-
ners as "hybrid." See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
1997).
101. See Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 134-35, 480 S.E.2d at 765.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 132, 480 S.E.2d at 764.
1082
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
funds and personal efforts to refurbishing this property prior to
its sale.' The husband then sold this residence and invested
the $82,000 sales proceeds into the purchase of a jointly titled
marital residence." 5 Throughout the marriage, the husband
contributed approximately $300,000 to improve and maintain
the marital residence. The wife dedicated her personal efforts to
refurbish, decorate and improve the home."° The trial court
found that one-half of the $82,000 down payment was gifted to
the wife.'0 7 On appeal, the husband argued that the wife
failed to prove the element of intent required to make a gift.
The wife argued that even if intent was not proven, it was not
error to find one-half of the property was marital due to her
efforts and contributions of separate funds to the property dur-
ing the marriage.0 8 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision and held that all of the proceeds from the sale
of the husband's separate property were transmuted to marital
property because the husband placed no reservations on the
transfer of title permitting him to reclaim the property. There
was also evidence that he told the wife that the property was
also her property."°
d. Division of Marital Share of Retirement Benefits
In Rowe, the trial court found that it could not award the
wife 25.6% of the husband's survivor benefits as the Commis-
sioner recommended, because his retirement plan did not per-
mit it." The trial court further found that the wife would not
be permitted to name an alternate beneficiary for her portion of
the marital share of the husband's retirement benefits because
under both state and federal law, the retirement plan did not
104. See adi at 136, 480 S.E.2d at 766.
105. See aL
106. See id. at 132, 480 S.E.2d at 764.
107. See iU at 136-37, 480 S.E.2d at 766-65.
108. See iU at 136-37, 480 S.E.2d at 766.
109. See id. at 137-38, 480 S.E.2d at 766-67. The court of appeals noted that, in
accordance with Theismann u. Theismann, 22 Va. App. 557, 471 S.E.2d 809 (1996),
the trial court is not required to make an equal distribution of this property on re-
mand, and need only make an equitable award after proper consideration of the fac-
tors contained in Vhinia Code section 20-107.3(E). See Theismanni, 22 Va. App. at
568, 471 S.E.2d at 814; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
110. See Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 141, 480 S.E.2d at 768.
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allow for the naming of an alternate beneficiary. While the
court of appeals agreed that the trial court did not have the
authority to order direct payments from the retirement plan
when the plan's provisions did not permit direct payments, the
court of appeals found that the trial court did have the authori-
ty to order the husband, rather than the plan, to pay the wife
her share of the retirement benefits."' The court of appeals
further held that the husband, rather than the plan, could be
ordered to pay the wife's alternate beneficiary in the event that
she predeceases him."' The court specifically found that Vir-
ginia Code section 20-107.3(G)(1) does not mandate that retire-
ment payments come directly from a spouse's retirement
plan."3
e. Post-Separation Earnings on Part Marital and Part Separate
Property
After the parties separated in Rowe, the husband made de-
posits into marital accounts from distributions of the newspaper
stock."" The trial court gave the husband credit for his post-
separation deposits in the equitable distribution award. The
court of appeals reversed, finding that any portion of the post-
separation contributions that were generated from the marital
portion of the newspaper stock dividends should be classified as
marital property."5
2. Frazer v. Frazer"6
a. Title
In Frazer, the Virginia Court of Appeals reiterated the long-
standing statutory requirement that courts must first determine
title in fashioning equitable distribution awards."7 The trial
111. See id. at 142, 480 S.E.2d at 769.
112. See id. (citing Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 421 S.E.2d 635 (1992)).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 143, 480 S.E.2d at 769.
115. See id. at 145, 480 S.E.2d at 770.
116. 23 Va. App. 358, 477 S.E.2d 290 (1996).
117. See id. at 368, 477 S.E.2d at 295.
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court had assigned values to various investment accounts of the
parties and distributed them without determining who held title
to these accounts."'
b. Retirement
Where the evidence fails to show which portion of a retire-
ment plan was earned before the marriage and which portion
was earned during the marriage, the court of appeals deter-
mined that it is error to classify such property as separate."'
In Frazer, the court of appeals remanded this issue to the trial
court with instructions to determine the value of the marital
and separate shares of the benefits in accordance with Virginia
Code section 20-107.3(G).' ° Neither Frazer nor the statute
addresses which party has the burden of presenting this evi-
dence, leaving the practitioner with very little guidance on this
issue."'
c. Tax Consequences
In an unusual turn of events, the wife in Frazer appealed the
trial court's award to her of eighty-one percent of the sales
proceeds of a jointly titled real estate parcel. She argued that
the court failed to consider the greater capital gains tax liabili-
ty she would incur by awarding her a greater portion of the
real estate.' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
division of this asset, finding that the court necessarily consid-
ered this factor by awarding her a greater portion of the asset
since each party was to pay their proportionate share of the tax
consequences."
118. See Ud at 367-68, 477 S.E.2d at 294-95. There was conflicting evidence on
how the accounts were titled. See id. at 369, 477 S.E.2d at 295.
119. See id. at 371, 477 S.E.2d at 296.
120. See id.
121. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
122. See Frazer, 23 Va. App. at 371-72, 477 S.E.2d at 296-97.
123. See id. at 372, 477 S.E.2d at 297.
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B. Support
1. Spousal Support/Separate Maintenance
a. Income Determination
In Rowe v. Rowe," the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's spousal support award to wife because the trial
court failed to consider the income generating potential of her
equitable distribution award." The court of appeals reiterated
that it is reversible error for the trial court not to consider all
of the factors contained in Virginia Code section 20-107.1.'
The husband appealed the $10,000 monthly spousal support
award to his wife because the trial court affirmed the
commissioner's report prior to quantifying the equitable distri-
bution award.1
27
The court of appeals decided an issue of first impression
relating to spousal support in Frazer v. Frazer.' It is now
the law that voluntary contributions to a retirement plan are to
be included in the payor spouse's income when determining
income for calculating spousal support." In reaching this de-
termination, the court of appeals relied, in part, on Virginia
Code section 20-107.1, which directs the trial court to consider
the "earning capacity, obligations and financial resources of the
parties, including but not limited to, all income from all pen-
sion, profit sharing or retirement plans of whatever nature."'
The court of appeals reasoned that other jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue include a spouse's voluntary contributions
to retirement accounts, pension plans, or savings accounts as
gross income for purposes of determining both spousal and child
support.3 ' The court of appeals found no reason to differen-
124. 24 Va. App. 123, 480 S.E.2d 760 (1997).
125. See id. at 139, 480 S.E.2d at 767.
126. See id. (citing Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 344, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426
(1986)).
127. See id. at 138, 480 S.E.2d at 767.
128. 23 Va. App. 358, 477 S.E.2d 290 (1996).
129. See id. at 378, 477 S.E.2d at 300.




tiate between gross income for spousal support and gross in-
come for child support."2 The court relied on Virginia's defini-
tion of gross income pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-
108.2(C), which includes income from all sources."3 The court
held that this definition shall also apply to spousal support
awards. Thus, anything that is not specifically excluded from
the definition of gross income, such as voluntary contributions
to retirement plans, shall be included.
The court of appeals in Frazer also ruled that the trial court
abused its discretion in limiting the duration of wife's pendente
lite support."M The wife demonstrated the need for spousal
support, and the record reflected no rationale for the time limi-
tation imposed. It was deemed reversible error to limit the
wife's pendente lite support, and not commence her permanent
support award until one month after the entry of the final
divorce decree."
Moreno v. Moreno... also presented an issue of first impres-
sion in the-Virginia Court of Appeals. The Moreno case requires
trial courts to consider income received by a payor spouse from
his or her pension or retirement plan when determining spousal
support. This is true regardless of whether the other spouse
had previously received his or her portion of the retirement
benefits pursuant to equitable distribution."'
132. See id
133. See id. at 378, 477 S.E.2d at 299. Virginia Code section 20-108.2(C) defines
gross income as:
all income from all sources, and shall include, but not be limited to,
income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits except as listed below, workers' compensation
benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits,
veterans' benefits, spousal support, rental income, gifts, prizes or awards.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
134. See 23 Va. App. at 376, 477 S.E.2d at 298. The trial court erred in Frazer by
limiting the pendente lite award to only three months. The final decree was entered
over eight months later, and permanent spousal support was not ordered to com-
mence until one month following entry of the decree, thus leaving wife with no sup-
port for a period of nine months. See id. at 375, 477 S.E.2d at 298.
135. See id.
136. 24 Va. App. 190, 480 S.E.2d 792 (1997).
137. See id. at 204, 480 S.E.2d at 799.
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In Moreno, the parties were divorced by a final decree which
incorporated their written property settlement agreement."9
The agreement required the husband to pay spousal support
and distributed as marital property the husband's pension
plans.139 The husband subsequently retired and moved the
court to terminate spousal support.'" At the time of the hear-
ing, the wife was already receiving her share of the pension
benefits directly from the husband's previous employer.' The
husband testified that his only income was from his pension
and interest earned from his savings account.' The wife tes-
tified that her need for spousal support was unchanged. Her
income was comprised of her salary, the spousal support from
the husband and her share of the husband's pension.'s The
trial court found a material change in circumstances and re-
duced the support from $2,600 per month to $800 per month,
denying husband's motion to terminate support.'"
On appeal, the husband argued that the language of Virginia
Code sections 20-107.1 and 20-107.3(G) was inconsistent. He
argued that the two statutes conflicted because one requires the
court to consider all of the financial resources of a party, in-
cluding pension income, and the other limits the division of a
party's pension to fifty percent of the marital share of cash
benefits actually received." Therefore, the husband contended
the trial court's failure to terminate his spousal support obliga-
tions resulted in a "double-dip" because the wife was already
receiving her maximum marital share of his pension pursuant
to the parties' agreement."
The court of appeals disagreed with the husband. In the
court's view, the Virginia General Assembly clearly intended
that income from all "pensions" was to be included in a trial
138. See id. at 192, 480 S.E.2d at 793.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 193, 480 S.E.2d at 794.
141. See id.
142. See Moreno, 24 Va. App. at 193, 480 S.E.2d at 794. Subsequent to the di-
vorce, the husband moved and became a resident of Thailand and was not legally
permitted to work in Thailand. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 194, 480 S.E.2d at 794.




court's calculation of spousal support.'47  Moreover, even
though Virginia Code section 20-107.3(G) limits a spouse's
award of retirement accounts for equitable distribution, there is
no statutory language precluding that property from later being
considered as income for the purposes of calculating spousal
support."4 To the contrary, Virginia Code section 20-107.1
mandates the trial court to consider property received by each
spouse when setting spousal support.49 The court of appeals
was also persuaded by the fact that other state legislatures
have specifically directed their trial courts not to consider pre-
viously awarded pension benefits when determining spousal
support."5 Since the Virginia legislature specifically declined
to exclude such a consideration, the court of appeals held that
it should be included. 5'
The court of appeals also relied on the theory that spousal
support and equitable distribution of property are two distinct
concepts.' 5 Thus, the non-pensioned spouse is not claiming
rights as a co-owner in the pension, but is merely asserting
that the pension income should not be ignored when reviewing
the parties' relative financial positions for spousal support."
Based on all of the above, the court of appeals held that the
trial court properly considered the husband's pension income as
a source of income in awarding the wife spousal support." 4
147. See id. at 199, 480 S.E.2d at 796-97 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1997)).
.148. See Moreno, 24 Va. App. at 199, 480 S.E.2d at 796.
149. See id. at 200, 480 S.E.2d at 797.
150. See d.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 201, 480 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Stumbo v. Stumbo, 20 Va. App. 685,
460 S.E.2d 591 (1995) (recognizing the distinction between equitable distribution
awards and spousal support awards)).
153. See id.
154. See Moreno, 24 Va. App. at 201, 480 S.E.2d at 798. The court noted that the
wife's share of her pension should also be included as a resource of hers in determin-
ing her need for support. See id. at 204, 480 S.E.2d at 799. Further, the property
settlement agreement contained no provisions excluding husband's share of the pen-
sion from his income for the purposes of recalculating his spousal support obligation.
See id-
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b. Modification of Existing Spousal Support Orders
In the case of Head v. Head,155 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the husband's child support reduction was not a
material change in circumstances to justify an increase in the
wife's spousal support." Each party filed cross-motions in the
trial court seeking modification of child and spousal sup-
port.'57 The trial court found that the only material change in
circumstances since their divorce and written property settle-
ment agreement was the 1995 legislative revision to the child
support guidelines." As a result, the trial court reduced the
husband's child support commensurate with the revised guide-
lines.'59 The trial court declined to increase the wife's spousal
support."6
The wife appealed and argued that the trial court erred by
not increasing her spousal support after finding no change in
her need for support. In the original proceeding, the trial court
had determined the "household need" was $7,000 per month.
After the husband's child support was decreased, the wife still
requested $7,000 per month proportioned between child and
spousal support. The court of appeals disagreed, relying on the
principle that "child support and spousal support are separate
and distinct obligations based on different criteria."'' In light
of this principle, the court of appeals held that a change in
child support is not a circumstance "material" to a spousal
support award.6 2
In Dickson v. Dickson," involving another issue of first im-
pression, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that when the
155. 24 Va. App. 166, 480 S.E.2d 780 (1997).
156. See id. at 177, 480 S.E.2d at 786.
157. See id. at 170, 480 S.E.2d at 782.
158. See id. In 1995, the legislature substantially reduced the percentage of sup-
port payable for monthly gross incomes exceeding $10,000 per month. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
159. See Head, 24 Va. App. at 171, 480 S.E.2d at 783.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 177-78, 480 S.E.2d at 786 (citing Lambert v. Lambert, 10 Va. App. 623,
628-29, 395 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1990) (holding that child support is not to be considered
in determining award of spousal support)).
162. See id.
163. 23 Va. App. 73, 474 S.E.2d 165 (1996).
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husband discharged his wife's equitable distribution award and
other joint debts in bankruptcy, the wife was entitled to an
increase in spousal support." The record on appeal revealed
that the trial court placed considerable weight on all of the
statutory factors, but particularly on the length of the marriage,
the wife's unemployment, and the equitable distribution of the
marital assets." At the modification hearing, the trial judge
felt that a central factor had been removed from the equation
since the wife never received her equitable distribution pro-
ceeds." Because the court had based its support award in
large part upon the money the wife received pursuant to equi-
table distribution, the husband's bankruptcy constituted a mate-
rial change in circumstances.'67
The court of appeals reviewed authority from other jurisdic-
tions and concluded that other state and federal courts had
uniformly considered a discharge in bankruptcy as a sufficient
material change in circumstances to trigger a support modifica-
tion.1" Although the court of appeals recognized the compet-
ing interests of giving the debtor a fresh start and the state
objective in resolving domestic disputes, it sided with the major-
ity of states.69
c. Periodic v. Lump Sum
Also in Dickson, the Virginia Court of Appeals took the op-
portunity to explain the distinction between periodic and lump
sum spousal support.70 The parties' final decree contained the
following language:
[Hiusband shall pay wife the sum of one thousand ($1,000)
dollars per month as spousal support and maintenance for
twelve months beginning October 1, 1992; eight hundred
($800) dollars per month for twelve months beginning Octo-
164. See id. at 81, 474 S.E.2d at 169.
165. See i& at 82, 474 S.E.2d at 169.
166. See id
167. See id
168. See id at 82, 474 S.E.2d at 170 (citing Siragusa v. Siragusa, 843 P.2d 807
(Nev. 1992)).
169. See id. at 85, 474 S.E.2d at 171.
170. See id. 78-79, 474 S.E.2d at 168.
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ber 1, 1993, and six hundred ($600) per month, for twelve
months, beginning October 1, 1994; with the husband's
obligation to provide spousal support to cease on September
30, 1995.... 171
When the husband discharged the wife's equitable distribu-
tion award in bankruptcy, she moved to increase her spousal
support.172 The husband moved the court for a judicial deter-
mination that the spousal support was not modifiable because it
was awarded as a lump sum. The trial court determined
that the support constituted periodic payments and was modifi-
able. 74 The husband appealed. The court of appeals defined a
periodic payment as:
a specified amount payable at designated intervals with the
sum total uncertain; the amount of the payment can be
modified by the court, if one of the parties can show a
change in circumstances, or the amount of payment can be
modified by agreement of the parties. The total amount of
periodic support due is contingent upon future events; the
right to each periodic payment becomes fixed and vested
only as each payment is due.' 5
In contrast, the court of appeals defined a lump sum award
as:
an order to pay a specific amount ... [it] is a fixed obliga-
tion to pay a sum certain when the decree is entered but
the amount may be payable either in deferred installments
or at once. That the payment method may allow for de-
ferred installment payments does not change the character
of the award. Thus, the right to the amount, whether pay-
able immediately or in installments, is fixed and vested at
the time of the final decree and the amount is unalterable
by court order, remarriage, or death.17
171. Id. at 77, 474 S.E.2d at 167 (omission in original).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 78, 474 S.E.2d at 168.
175. Id. at 79, 474 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 342, 10
S.E.2d 893, 898 (1940)).




In Dickson, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the
spousal support award was not a fixed obligation to pay a sum
certain when the decree was entered. The award specified an
amount payable at designated intervals. The amount due be-
came vested only as each payment was due. Therefore, the
court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the support
was periodic and modifiable.
17
d. Spousal Support v. Monetary Award
In Dotson v. Dotson,75 the Virginia Court of Appeals distin-
guished a lump sum spousal support award from an equitable
distribution award.7 9 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's award to the wife because it did not distinguish between
spousal support and property distribution."' The trial court
awarded the wife a "lump sum" of $1.8 million. The trial court
also ordered the husband to either provide the wife with health
insurance or pay her $425 per month, which was the current
cost of her health insurance.18' The trial court stated in its
opinion that it was not required to distinguish whether the
award was intended as support or as property distribution. 82
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that there is a dis-
tinct difference between a spousal support award and a mone-
tary award." A trial court should award spousal support
based on each party's current need and the ability of the payor
spouse to pay from current assets." Conversely, a trial court
177. See id. The court of appeals also relied on the fact that the trial court had
not enumerated any special circumstances or compelling reasons that would have
justified a lump sum award. See id. (citing Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1, 5-6, 389
S.E.2d 723, 725 (1990)). Special circumstances or compelling reasons would include
husband's inability to pay future periodic payments or wife's immediate need for a
lump sum to maintain herself or satisfy debts. See id.
178. 24 Va. App. 40, 480 S.E.2d 131 (1997).
179. See id. at 44, 480 S.E.2d at 132.
180. See id. at 40, 480 S.E.2d at 131.
181. See i&
182. See id at 43-44, 480 S.E.2d at 132.
183. See id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 246, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368
(1987)). Spousal support involves a legal duty flowing from one spouse to the other
by virtue of the marital relationship. By contrast, a monetary award does not flow
from any legal duty, but involves an adjustment of the equities, rights and interests
of the parties in marital property. See id.
184. See id. (citing Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66
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makes an equitable distribution award in order to recognize the
marital partnership and equitably divide the marital
wealth.'" The trial court must also consider its equitable dis-
tribution award in fashioning a support award. It is improper,
however, for the trial court to consider spousal support when
making an equitable distribution award. Thus, the court of
appeals remanded the case to the trial court to separately rede-
termine equitable distribution and spousal support."
e. Pleadings
In Reid v. Reid,' the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
the husband's Bill of Complaint did not sufficiently raise the
issue of spousal support."s The case originated in the juvenile
court where wife was awarded both child support and spousal
support."9 The husband appealed the juvenile court order to
the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the order and re-
manded all future support matters back to the juvenile
court."9 The husband then filed for a "no fault" divorce in the
circuit court. In his Bill of Complaint, he requested "that the
court decree that the [parties] be perpetually protected in their
persons and property." 9' The husband did not specifically
mention "spousal support" or the previous support order. 9 '
The wife was personally served with the complaint and a notice
to take depositions, but she did not respond or appear at the
scheduled hearing.' In accordance with the husband's prayer
for relief, the trial court entered a divorce decree which revoked
all previous support awards."M More than twenty-one days
(1987)).
185. See id. at 44, 480 S.E.2d at 133 (citing Williams, 4 Va. App. at 24, 354
S.E.2d at 66).
186. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(F) (Repl. Vol. 1995) (monetary award
must be determined without regard to support)); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(8) (Repl.
Vol. 1995) (in determining an amount of support award, a court must consider, inter
alia, provisions made with regard to the distribution of marital property).
187. 24 Va. App. 146, 480 S.E.2d 771 (1997).
188. See id. at 150, 480 S.E.2d at 772.
189. See id. at 148, 480 S.E.2d at 772.
190. See id.






later, the wife moved to set aside the provisions of the decree
relating to spousal support.' Following a contested hearing
on the issue, the trial court reversed its previous spousal sup-
port revocation and awarded the wife all support arrearages
under the pre-existing order.'96
The husband appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the decree.9 7 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court and found that the
original decree was void. It reasoned that Virginia Code section
20-79(B) conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to award sup-
port and maintenance only at the "request" of "either party to
the proceedings."'98 The trial court's exercise of this power
was dependent on the husband's pleadings having raised the
issue.' A decree entered in the absence of pleadings is
void." -The court of appeals explained that although the
husband's Bill of Complaint properly invoked the court's juris-
diction to enter the divorce, the court was precluded from exer-
cising jurisdiction over spousal support if the husband did not
specifically request that relief.201 Accordingly, the trial court's
original revocation of the prior support order was a nullity.2 2
The husband also argued that the previous spousal support
order terminated by operation of law when the divorce was
entered. The court of appeals found that argument was without
merit. They explained that an existing spousal support order




197. See i&L Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:1 states that, "[a]ll final judgments,
orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of
the trial court.., for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." VA.
Sup. CT. R. 1:1.
198. Reid, 24 Va. App. at 149, 480 S.E.2d at 772.
199. See id. (citing Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Va. App. 16, 19, 340 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1986)).
200. See id. (citing Potts v. Mathieson-Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 207, 181 S.E.2d
521, 525 (1935)).
201. See id. at 150, 480 S.E.2d at 773.
202. See id. Because the original order terminating support was null and void, the
trial court did not violate Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:1 when it later modified
the spousal support provision of the order. See id.
203. See id. at 151, 480 S.E.2d at 773 (citing Werner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
623, 624-25, 186 S.E.2d 76, 77-78 (1972)).
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f. Separate Maintenance
In Scott v. Scott,2 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
a separate maintenance award terminates at the time a divorce
is granted.0 5 The court of appeals explained that "separate
maintenance" is the allowance "paid by one married person to
the other for support if they are no longer living as husband
and wife."2" A separate maintenance award depends upon the
existence of a marriage relationship."' When the marriage is
terminated by divorce, it discharges the responsible spouse from
his or her liability for separate maintenance payments awarded
under a previous decree.0 8 Similarly, the court's jurisdiction
to award separate maintenance also terminates.
2. Child Support
a. Extraordinary Medical Expenses
In Frazer v. Frazer,2° the Virginia Court of Appeals reiter-
ated its prior decisions regarding the allocation of the payment
of extraordinary medical expenses for dependent children by
holding that extraordinary medical expenses not covered by
insurance shall be apportioned according to a percentage equal
to each party's child support obligation. 10 The court of ap-
peals also affirmed its decision in Carter v. Thornhill21' that
deviating from the guidelines to require parties to pay past
extraordinary medical expenses, as well as continuing expenses,
is permitted under Virginia Code section 20-108.2(D).212
204. 24 Va. App. 364, 482 S.E.2d 110 (1997).
205. See id. at 368, 482 S.E.2d at 112.
206. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (6th ed. 1990)).
207. See id.
208. See id. at 369, 482 S.E.2d at 112.
209. 23 Va. App. 358, 477 S.E.2d 290 (1996).
210. See id. at 372-74, 477 S.E.2d at 297-98; see also Carter v. Thornhill, 19 Va.
App. 501, 506, 453 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1995).
211. 19 Va. App. 501, 453 S.E.2d 295 (1995).





Frazer clarified a longstanding issue among practitioners as
to whether spousal support should be included in the gross
income of the receiving spouse for purposes of determining child
support pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-108.2(C) when the
issues are addressed in the same proceeding. 13 The court of
appeals held that spousal support shall be deducted from the
payor spouse's income and included in the payee spouse's in-
come. The trial court must follow a three-step process in di-
vorce proceedings.214 The court must first determine equitable
distribution, then spousal support, and then child support. 5
Additionally, although a spousal support order must pre-exist
the determination of child support, the plain meaning of Virgin-
ia Code section 20-108.2(C) contemplates spousal support "be-
tween the parties to the present proceeding.""'
The court of appeals further found that voluntary contribu-
tions to a retirement account must also be included in the gross
income of a parent for purposes of calculating child support.217
Determining whether to impute income to a party for purpos-
es of calculating child support continues to be highly controver-
sial, as is evidenced by the court's decision in Mansfield v.
Taylor."' The Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed the
effect of a voluntary change of employment on a party's child
support obligation in the case of Antonelli v. Antonelli."19 In
Antonelli, the supreme court held that voluntarily leaving a
salaried position to take on a commissioned position, even if it
was a bona fide and reasonable business undertaking, "was a
risk that fell upon the obligor and not upon the children."2





218. 24 Va. App. 108, 480 S.E.2d 752 (1997).
219. 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991). In both Mansfield and Antonelli, the
parties were seeking a modification of child support based upon a job change. Thus,
both parties were aware of their support obligations prior to making the change. See
Mansfield, 24 Va. App. at 114-15, 480 S.E.2d at 755-56.
220. Antonelli, 242 Va. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 119-20.
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The court in Mansfield determined that the holding in Antonelli
requires that a career change be made in good faith and with-
out disregard for one's support obligations. 1 In Mansfield,
the payor parent opted to pursue a new career which restricted
his income to no more than $9,600 per year for a period of
seven years, with the expectation that the job would pay well
in the future. 2 The court found that this was unsatisfactory
because the father had a current obligation to his children.'
Thus, by ensuring he would have a very low income in his new
position, he evidenced a careless disregard for his existing sup-
port obligation and income should be imputed to him.'
In a case of first impression, the Virginia Court of Appeals,
in Moreno v. Moreno,' addressed the issue of whether a trial
court is required to calculate the presumptive amount of child
support prior to entering a consent decree on support. In
Moreno, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce incorpo-
rating the parties' property settlement agreement, which provid-
ed that the father would pay a sum certain to the mother in
monthly child support for the parties' two children.' Neither
party objected to the entry of the decree and no appeal was
taken.' Later, when a show cause order was entered against
the father for his failure to pay child support, he moved to
dismiss the order." He argued that the child support decree
was void because it made no reference to the presumptive child
support guidelines and contained no written findings as to why
the presumptive amount would be unjust or inappropriate,
pursuant to the provisions of Virginia Code sections 20-108.1
and 20-108.2.' The court of appeals held that the original
decree was binding because the amount of child support was
never disputed or questioned at the time the order was en-
tered.' 0 The court of appeals distinguished this case from
221. See Mansfield, 24 Va. App. at 114, 480 S.E.2d at 755.
222. See id. at 114-15, 480 S.E.2d at 755.
223. See id. at 115, 480 S.E.2d at 756.
224. See id.
225. 24 Va. App. 227, 481 S.E.2d 482 (1997).
226. See id. at 229, 481 S.E.2d at 484.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 230, 481 S.E.2d at 484.
229. See id. at 230, 481 S.E.2d at 484; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Cmn.
Supp. 1997).
230. See Moreno, 24 Va. App. at 233, 481 S.E.2d at 485.
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those where the child support was in dispute at the time the
divorce decree was entered or those cases where a party had
specifically requested that the court calculate child support."'
c. Modification of Existing Child Support Orders
Head v. Head2 addresses the fluctuation in income of an
obligor as a material change in circumstances warranting a
modification. In Head, the evidence proved that the husband's
income varied because of the nature of his business.' The
trial court found that while the husband's income fluctuated as
much as thirty-two percent in a three-year period, there was
only a 6.25% reduction in his current income, which did not
constitute a material change in circumstances.' However, the
trial court did recalculate child support because the guidelines
themselves had changed since the court's previous ruling on the
issue.' The court used the husband's prior income, as op-
posed to his current reduced income, for the new calcula-
tion.
6
The husband appealed, arguing that once a material change
in circumstances has been proven (i.e. guidelines modification),
the court must use current income to recalculate support. 7
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that under his theory,
"a party seeking a support modification could achieve, through
the back door, a result barred by the front door."' Although
it appears that Head is inconsistent with the Virginia Court of
Appeals' decision in Cooke v. Cooke," decided only months
before, these cases are distinguishable. In Cooke, the court of
appeals held that an amendment to the statutory guideline
schedule constitutes a material change in circumstances for
purposes of adjusting child support.' Prior to the change in
231. See id. at 232, 481 S.E.2d at 485; see also Scott v. Scott, 12 Va. App. 1245,
408 S.E.2d 579 (1991); Spagnolo v. Spagnolo, 20 Va. App. 736, 460 S.E.2d 616 (1995).
232. 24 Va. App. 166, 480 S.E.2d 780 (1997).
233. See id. at 175, 480 S.E.2d at 784.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 177, 480 S.E.2d at 786.
236. See id.
237. See ii. at 175-177, 480 S.E.2d 785-786.
238. 1d. at 176-177, 480 S.E.2d at 786.
239. 23 Va. App. 60, 474 S.E.2d 159 (1996).
240. See id. at 64, 474 S.E.2d at 161. This decision is consistent with Slonha v.
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the guidelines themselves, the court of appeals in Cooke had al-
ready determined that other changes existed warranting a re-
view of the previous award."' In Head, there were no other
changes and the issue of the father's income was considered res
judicata.' 2
In Orlandi v. Orlandi,' the Virginia Court of Appeals ex-
panded the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Featherstone v. Brooks,' by addressing the standard required
to modify a child support order submitted with the consent of
the parties.' The court of appeals specifically found that
Featherstone implicitly "held that the material change of cir-
cumstances test for modification of child support should be
utilized when an award is based on a consent decree."' The
father in Orlandi met this burden by establishing that the
child's mother had remarried, that the mother received econom-
ic benefits from her new husband, and that the mother refused
to help pay some of the child's expenses after agreeing to do so
in the consent decree.'?
C. Custody
In the case of Bostick v. Bostick-Bennett,' the Virginia
Court of Appeals set the standard for modifying an order pro-
hibiting removal of a child from the state.2" In Bostick, the
trial court awarded the father sole physical custody of the
parties' minor child but denied him the opportunity to relocate
Pennline, 17 Va. App. 662, 664-65, 440 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1994) and MUlligan v.
Milligan, 12 Va. App. 982, 988, 407 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1991).
241. See Cooke, 23 Va. App. at 64, 474 S.E.2d at 161.
242. See Head, 24 Va. App. at 177, 480 S.E.2d at 786. On appeal, the wife argued
that the trial court erred by failing to deviate upward from the new guideline
amount because the previous presumptive amount was evidence of the child's needs.
This argument was summarily rejected by the court. See id.
243. 23 Va. App. 21, 473 S.E.2d 716 (1996).
244. 220 Va. 443, 258 S.E.2d 513 (1979).
245. See Orlandi, 23 Va. App. at 26-27, 473 S.E.2d at 719.
246. Id. at 26, 473 S.E.2d at 719.
247. See id. at 27-28, 473 S.E.2d at 719. The court of appeals specifically noted
that this holding does not mean that a new spouse must support the other spouse's
children, but simply that remarriage may change one parent's ability to provide sup-
port for his or her children. See id. at 29, 473 S.E.2d at 720.
248. 23 Va. App. 527, 478 S.E.2d 319 (1996).
249. See id. at 529, 478 S.E.2d at 320.
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to North Carolina." ° He was ordered to give thirty days no-
tice of any future intention to relocate. The order further stated
that the child was not to be removed from the state if an objec-
tion was noted."' At a subsequent hearing on relocation, the
father presented evidence that he had "developed a concrete
plan for his relocation to North Carolina." 2 The guardian ad
litem supported the father's relocation proposal.' There was
also evidence that the mother's circumstances had changed. She
had remarried, was pregnant, and had demonstrated increased
stability.' The trial court again denied the father's request to
relocate to North Carolina. 5 The trial court felt the father
had failed to prove a material change in circumstances on the
issue of the child's removalY
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, find-
ing that in order to modify a decree regarding removal, the
court must find "(1) a material change of circumstance since the
initial decree; and (2) that relocation would be in the child's
best interest." 7 The court of appeals specifically noted that
while the father had developed a more concrete plan to relo-
cate, this was not the reason that the trial court had refused to
allow the removal in the first place.' Therefore, the more
concrete plan was not determinative of the issue."' The trial
court specifically stated that it would not allow the removal
upon entry of the initial decree, because it wanted both parents
to be actively involved in the child's life.2  In denying the
modification, the trial court reiterated this goal."e
250. See id. at 531, 478 S.E.2d at 321.
251. See id.
252. Id-
253. See i&. at 532, 478 S.E.2d at 321-22.
254. See Bostick, 23 Va. App. at 532, 478 S.E.2d at 321.
255. See id. at 531, 478 S.E.2d at 322.
256. See U at 532, 478 S.E.2d at 322.
257. Id. at 535, 478 S.E.2d at 323.
258. See id. at 536, 478 S.E.2d at 323.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 531, 478 S.E.2d at 321.
261. See id. at 533, 478 S.E.2d at 322.
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D. Procedure
1. Evidence
In Street v. Street,262 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant, faced
with out of court contempt charges, must be given the opportu-
nity to present evidence in his defense, including the right to
examine the opposing party, and the right to call witnesses."
Since inability to pay is a valid defense to a contempt charge,
the trial court erred when it refused to allow the husband to
call witnesses to develop this testimony.26 The wife, relying
on Antonelli v. Antonelli," contended that the trial court did
not err because the husband previously testified that he volun-
tarily closed his business.2 She argued that such a voluntary
change could never be a defense to contempt.27 The court of
appeals disagreed and distinguished between a support modifi-
cation proceeding and a contempt proceeding. 2' Although
Antonelli held that a reduction of income as a result of a
parent's intentional act, even if done in good faith, does not
warrant a support modification, this standard is not applicable
to contempt charges unless the evidence shows the act was
continuous.269
262. 24 Va. App. 14, 480 S.E.2d 118 (1997).
263. See id. at 20, 480 S.E.2d at 121.
264. See id.
265. 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991).
266. See Street, 24 Va. App. at 21, 480 S.E.2d at 122.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 21-22, 480 S.E.2d at 122.
269. See id. at 22, 480 S.E.2d at 122. The court of appeals explained that con-
tempt proceedings are controlled by the standard as set forth in Laing v. Common-
wealth, 205 Va. 511, 137 S.E.2d 896 (1964), which states that it is true that the
inability of an alleged contemner, without fault on his part, to render obedience to an
order of court is a good defense to a charge of contempt. But where an alleged con-
temner has voluntarily and contumaciously brought on himself disability to obey an
order, he cannot avail himself of a plea of inability to obey as a defense to the




In Fahey v. Fahey,27 the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision to modify a Qualified Domestic Rela-
tions Order (QDRO) more than twenty-one days after it was
entered."' In Fahey, the husband appealed an order amending
an existing QDRO distributing his Keogh plan2 2 After a re-
hearing en banc, the court of appeals panel concurred in the
decision to reverse the amended QDRO.
The parties were divorced by final decree which reserved
jurisdiction over equitable distribution.274 Thereafter, the par-
ties executed a property settlement agreement which was incor-
porated into a consent order.275 The QDRO in question allot-
ted "one-half of the accrued value of the [Keogh] Plan as of [the
date of the separation agreement]."276 One year later, the ad-
ministrator of the retirement plan divided the assets in-kind
rather than in accordance with the separation agreement.277
The husband objected to an in-kind division due to the substan-
tial increase in the account value since the valuation date.278
The wife argued that the administrator had acted properly and
moved the court to enter an amended QDRO assigning her
=one-half of the shares of the plan as of [the agreement date],
together with any appreciation or depreciation that had accrued
since that time until the time of distribution. 279 The initial
QDRO was never appealed and was final prior to the disputed
amendment.'
The court of appeals acknowledged that a trial court has the
jurisdiction to "[m]odify any order.., intended to effect or
divide any pension, profit-sharing, or deferred compensation
270. 24 Va. App. 254, 481 S.E.2d 496 (1997).
271. See 1d. at 257, 481 S.E.2d at 497.
272. See id. at 255, 481 S.E.2d at 496.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 255-56, 481 S.E.2d at 496.
276. Id. at 256, 481 S.E.2d at 497 (quoting the QDRO).
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. Id. (quoting the amended QDRO).
280. See id. (citing Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 94-95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987)).
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plan or retirement benefits ... to revise or conform its terms
so as to effectuate the expressed intent of the order." How-
ever, the modification must be "consistent with the substantive
provisions of the original decree."29 2 The court of appeals ex-
plained that an amendment cannot adjust terms to take into
account a party's change in circumstances.' The court of ap-
peals stated that the manifest intent of the original QDRO was
to allot the wife one-half of the account value on the agreement
date.' Even though this calculation method later disfavored
the wife because of the increased account value, the court
lacked authority to substantively modify the order.'
In Romine v. Romine,2 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that even though a circuit court had previously remanded fu-
ture spousal support issues to the juvenile court, its subsequent
exercise of jurisdiction over these matters divested the juvenile
court of jurisdiction. 7
In Romine, the circuit court awarded the wife $900 per
month in spousal support.' The final decree then transferred
future jurisdiction over spousal support to the juvenile
court. 9  The husband subsequently lost his job and filed a pe-
tition in the circuit court to reduce the support.' The parties
agreed to abate the support payments. The circuit court entered
a Consent Order abating the spousal support which did not
transfer the matter back to the juvenile court.29' Several
months later, when the husband became employed, upon the
wife's petition, the juvenile court reinstated spousal support.2
The husband appealed the juvenile court order. The juvenile
court set a $5,000 bond with surety, which the husband failed
281. Id. at 256-57, 481 S.E.2d at 497 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(K)(4) (Repl.
Vol. 1995)).
282. Id. (quoting Caudle v. Caudle, 18 Va. App. 795, 798, 447 S.E.2d 247, 249
(1994)).
283. See id. (citing Caudle, 18 Va. App. at 798, 447 S.E.2d at 249).
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. 22 Va. App. 760, 473 S.E.2d 99 (1996).
287. See id. at 763-66, 473 S.E.2d at 101-02.







to post." s The husband petitioned the circuit court to permit
his appeal without posting the bond. The circuit court denied
the husband's request, ruling that only the juvenile court had
jurisdiction over the bond.' Implicit in the circuit court's rul-
ing was a finding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
reinstate the spousal supportY
The husband appealed to the court of appeals. He argued
that the circuit court's subsequent exercise of jurisdiction abat-
ing the support divested the juvenile court of further jurisdic-
tion." The court of appeals held that when a circuit court
transfers matters to a juvenile court, it creates concurrent juris-
diction in each court.'? However, a juvenile court does not re-
tain jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer if the circuit court again
exercises jurisdiction in the case."5 The court of appeals ex-
plained that the juvenile court's jurisdiction exists only as a
result of the circuit court's action.2" If a circuit court decides
to resume jurisdiction, it conclusively determines that the mat-
ter will be litigated in a court of record.3" It follows that the
circuit court intends to preclude the juvenile court from acting
further on that issue.~'s Accordingly, when the circuit court
assumed jurisdiction over the support matter subsequent to its
transfer pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-79(C), its action
divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction'0 2 Thus, because the
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate spousal support
after the circuit court abated it, the circuit court order was




296. See id. at 763, 473 S.E.2d at 100.
297. See id. at 763, 473 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Crabtree v. Crabtree, 17 Va. App.
81, 86, 435 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1993)). The circuit court retains its continuing jurisdic-
tion to modify custody and support matters pursuant to Virginia Code sections 20-108
and -109.
298. See id. at 764, 473 S.E.2d at 101.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 765-66, 473 S.E.2d at 102.
301. See id (citing Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887).
302. See id; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(C) (Repl. Vol. & Cure. Supp. 1997).
303. See Romine, 22 Va. App. at 765-66, 473 S.E.2d at 102.
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In Commonwealth v. Richter,3 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals had one of the first opportunities to interpret the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).03 UIFSA adopts the
concept of continuing exclusive jurisdiction to establish and
modify support."0 6 Under UIFSA, once a court or administra-
tive agency with jurisdiction enters a support decree, it is the
only body entitled to modify the decree as long as it retains
continuing exclusive jurisdiction under the Act. Another state,
while required by UIFSA to enforce the existing decree, has no
power under the Act to modify the original decree.07
In Richter, the trial court, believing it lacked jurisdiction,
declined to enforce its original support order which it had en-
tered twenty years earlier.3" After entry of the original order,
both parties left Virginia." The husband moved to South
Carolina and the wife moved to California. 1 ' Years later, the
wife filed a wage withholding request through the California
Child Support Agency in South Carolina. 11 The South Caroli-
na court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the husband, but
denied the wage withholding request because the husband dis-
puted the arrearage." 2 The South Carolina court took no fur-
ther action."3
The wife then moved the California Child Support Agency to
recover the support arrearages in Virginia."4 The Virginia cir-
cuit court ruled it had no jurisdiction to enforce the order, be-
lieving that South Carolina had usurped jurisdiction.1 5 The
Virginia Court of Appeals reversed and explained that the Vir-
ginia court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
304. 23 Va. App. 186, 475 S.E.2d 817 (1996).
305. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.32-.82 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997). The
UIFSA replaced the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA) and is intended to provide a means to establish and enforce child support
and spousal support obligations across state lines.
306. See Richter, 23 Va. App. at 190, 475 S.E.2d at 819 (citation omitted).
307. See id. (citation omitted).
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dent individual when, among other things, the individual re-
sided with the child in the Commonwealth or when the exercise
of personal jurisdiction was authorized under the Virginia Long
Arm Statute. 16 Under UIFSA, Virginia had continuing exclu-
sive jurisdiction over support as long as the Commonwealth re-
mained the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or
the child.317 However, the statute does not state, either by ex-
press terms or by implication, that Virginia loses all jurisdiction
if none of the parties are continuing residents. 8' The court of
appeals reversed and held that Virginia continued to have the
right to enforce its own decree even if all of the parties were no
longer residents. 19
The Virginia Court of Appeals has held that a circuit court
has no jurisdiction to terminate parental rights. In Church v.
Church,32 the circuit court determined that the father had
abandoned the parties' child. The circuit court believed it was
in the child's best interest to terminate the father's residual pa-
rental rights, and did so in the final decree pursuant to former
Virginia Code section 16.1-279(A)(1)."' The divorce decree also
eliminated the father's obligation to pay child support and not-
316. See id. at 192, 475 S.E.2d at 820; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol.
1992 & Curm. Supp. 1997), 20-88.35(3), 20-88.35(6) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
1997). The Virginia Long Arm statute provides jurisdiction over an individual who
has been ordered to pay spousal support or child support pursuant to an order en-
tered by any court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth having in perso-
nam jurisdiction over such person. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(AX8Xi) (Repl. Vol.
1992 & Curm Supp. 1997).
317. See Richter, 23 Va. App. at 192, 475 S.E.2d at 820.
318. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cur. Supp. 1997).
319. The intent of the statute is to facilitate the enforcement of support orders by
making other states equally available to an obligee. See Richter, 23 Va. App. at 192,
475 S.E.2d at 820.
320. 24 Va. App. 502, 483 S.E. 498 (1997).
321. See id. at 504, 483 S.E.2d at 499. Virginia Code section 16.1-279(A), in effect
at the time of the final decree, is for all purposes material to this appeal identical to
Virginia Code section 16.1-278.2, which provides in pertinent part:
If a child is found to be ... abandoned by his parent... the juvenile
court or the circuit court may make ... [an] order of disposition to
protect the welfare of the child ... [tierminat[ing] the rights of the
parent pursuant to § 16.1-283.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1996).
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ed the mother's agreement to forego any claim for delinquent
child support. 2
Several years later, the mother filed a petition for child sup-
port." The mother acknowledged that the previous decree
terminated the father's obligation to pay support, but argued
that the child's best interest required a support order."M The
father moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the previous
decree barred the requested relief and that the time for seeking
relief had expired."s The trial court granted father's motion,
ruling that it had properly terminated father's parental rights
pursuant to Virginia Code sections 16.1-241(A)(5) and 16.1-
244.3" The mother failed to timely appeal the decree."
Therefore, in order to have the decree set aside, the mother had
to establish that the decree was void."M
The court of appeals held the original decree was void,"
explaining that a circuit court's authority to terminate parental
rights and support obligations is limited." ° The court of ap-
peals found that the trial court erroneously assumed jurisdic-
tion by relying on Title 16.1 of the Virginia Code."' Title
16.1, titled "Courts not of Record," addresses only juvenile court
powers. 2 Section 16.1-241 of the Virginia Code does not con-
fer original jurisdiction on the circuit courts where none other-
wise exists.3" The court of appeals explained that even
though section 16.1-241(A)(5) of the Virginia Code mentions
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, it does not consti-
tute a grant of jurisdiction to the circuit courts.' "It simply
affirms that, where jurisdiction is granted to the circuit
322. See Church, 24 Va. App. at 504, 483 S.E.2d at 499.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 504-05, 483 S.E.2d at 499.
326. See id. at 505, 483 S.E.2d at 499-500.
327. See id. at 505, 482 S.E.2d at 500.
328. See id. (citing Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. App. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758
(1987)).
329. See id. at 508, 483 S.E.2d at 501.
330. See id. at 505-06, 483 S.E.2d at 500 (citations omitted).
331. See id. at 506, 483 S.E.2d at 500.
332. See id.
333. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
334. See Church, 24 Va. App. at 507, 483 S.E.2d at 501 (footnote omitted).
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courts,... [it] is not exclusive." 5 If jurisdiction does not ex-
ist, it cannot be concurrent with another court's jurisdiction.36
Further, the circuit court has no original jurisdiction to termi-
nate parental rights. The circuit court's jurisdictional powers
are conferred by section 17-123 of the Virginia Code.337 That
section grants the circuit courts "original and general jurisdic-
tion of all cases in chancery and civil cases at law and jurisdic-
tion of all other matters... made cognizable therein by
law." ' The circuit court's jurisdiction in matters relating to
minor children is further made cognizable in Titles 20, 63.1 and
31 of the Virginia Code, none of which relate to termination of
parental rights."9 Therefore, the circuit court's original order
was void.'
Moreover, the court of appeals found the trial court's decision
terminating the father's child support obligation was in part
based on the parties' agreement." The court of appeals has
previously established that such agreements are "void as
against public policy and unenforceable as a matter of law."12
A trial court's refusal to dismiss a show cause order is not an
appealable decree. In Moreno v. Moreno,' a show cause order
was entered against the husband for his failure to pay child
support. The husband moved to dismiss the show cause or-
der.' The trial court denied the husband's motion and re-
duced its finding to an order, which the husband did not ap-
peal. More than thirty days later, the trial court found the
husband in contempt. 5 The husband did appeal the contempt
order. The wife argued that the husband's appeal was untimely




338. Id. (citation omitted).
339. See id.
340. See id. at 508, 483 S.E.2d at 501.
341. See id.
342. Id. (citing Kelley v. Kelley,'248 Va. 295, 298-99, 449 S.E.2d 55, 56-57 (1994)
(stating that parties' agreements to terminate child support are void as against public
policy)).
343. 24 Va. App. 227, 481 S.E.2d 482 (1997).
344. See id. at 230, 481 S.E.2d at 484.
345. See id.
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motion to dismiss the show cause order."4 The court of ap-
peals held that the original order was not an appealable order
because it did not dispose of the whole subject. 7
The court of appeals has original jurisdiction over circuit
court final decrees in domestic relations matters that arise
under Title 16.1 or 20 of the Virginia Code. Original jurisdic-
tion also arises over an interlocutory decree or an order involv-
ing the granting, dissolving, or denying of an injunction or an
order that adjudicates "the principles of a cause." '
The court of appeals defined a final decree as one "which
disposes of the whole subject matter and gives all the relief
that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by the
court."3 49  In this instance, the trial court still had to proceed
with the actual show cause hearing so the order was not fi-
nal.350 Accordingly, unless the husband's motion constituted an
"interlocutory decree that adjudicated the principles of the
cause" the court would not have had jurisdiction to consider an
appeal of the first order.35' The court of appeals defined an
"interlocutory decree which adjudicated the principles of a
cause" as a decree in which
the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are
to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it
is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the
facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of
the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the
suit.352
When the trial court denied the husband's motion to dismiss
the show cause petition, it did not determine whether husband
had cause for failing to pay his child support. Nor had the
court determined what terms it would impose for such a failure.
Therefore, it was not an order that adjudicated the principles of
346. See id.
347. See id. at 231, 481 S.E.2d at 484.
348. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-116.05(3)(f)-.05(4) (Repl. Vol. 1996)).








the cause, and the husband's appeal of the later contempt order
was timely.3"
E. Property Settlement Agreements
In Allocca v. Allocca,M the Virginia Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the effect of a bankruptcy filing on a property settlement
agreement. In Allocca, the parties were divorced by final decree
that affirmed, ratified and incorporated by reference a property
settlement agreement from a previous separation."'5 The wife
later moved to set aside the agreement, arguing that her hus-
band had, among other things, repudiated the agreement by
obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy."
During their previous separation, the husband and wife exe-
cuted the agreement in question and sold their residence. They
distributed the sales proceeds in accordance with their agree-
ment.35 They had performed all of their obligations under the
previous agreement, and nothing further remained to be
done.' Husband and wife then reconciled. They purchased a
new residence and signed a deed of trust note.5 ' When they
separated again, the husband made the monthly payments.3"
Several days after the wife filed for divorce, the husband fied
for bankruptcy. 5 ' The husband listed his wife on the bank-
ruptcy schedules as a co-debtor on the deed of trust note.5 '
The bankruptcy court discharged the husband of his obligations
while the divorce action was pending. 3 The trial court then
entered the divorce decree and incorporated their initial agree-
ment into the final decree, which the wife appealed."
353. See id.
354. 23 Va. App. 571, 478 S.E.2d 702 (1996).
355. See id. at 573, 478 S.E.2d at 703.
356. See id.
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The wife argued that the husband's discharge in bankruptcy
constituted a repudiation of the agreement which gave her the
right to rescind the agreement.3" The court of appeals found
that the husband had not discharged his obligations under the
agreement. He only discharged in bankruptcy his obligation on
the deed of trust note for which he and his wife were jointly
and severally liable."a The previous agreement had not re-
quired the husband to pay the deed of trust note, because it
was executed more than a year after the agreement was signed.
When the husband filed for bankruptcy, he had already fully
performed his obligations under the agreement. Therefore, his
bankruptcy was not a repudiation of their agreement entitling
the wife to rescind the agreement.387
F. Attorney's Fees
In O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin," the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to award
attorney's fees for an appeal unless the court of appeals spe-
cifically remands on that issue. 69 In O'Loughlin, on the origi-
nal appeal, the trial court's ruling was affirmed."' The court
of appeals issued a mandate providing an itemized statement of
costs payable to the appellee.3"' The wife then petitioned the
trial court for attorney's fees that she incurred on the appeal
which the trial court granted. The husband appealed the
attorney's fee award and the court of appeals held that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to make the award. The court went on
365. See id. The wife relied on Carter v. Carter, 18 Va. App. 787, 447 S.E.2d 522
(1994), where husband filed for bankruptcy after he separated from wife. See id at
788, 447 S.E.2d at 523. He listed wife as a creditor and identified his obligation to
wife under the parties' property settlement agreement. The court of appeals found
that case distinguishable from the present case because, in Carter, the parties' agree-
ment contained a specific provision that called for recision in the event of a breach.
See Allocca, 23 Va. App. at 575, 478 S.E.2d at 704.
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. 23 Va. App. 690, 479 S.E.2d 98 (1996).
369. See id. at 694, 479 S.E.2d at 100.
370. See id.
371. See id. at 692-93, 479 S.E.2d at 99.
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to string cite cases going as far back as 1936 where the issue of
attorney's fees was specifically remanded to the trial court.72
372. See id at 694, 479 S.E.2d at 100.
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